Zalmai Nishat
This interview with Zalmai Nishat, the Founder and Executive Chair of Mosaic Global Foundation was originally published in The Narrative 360 on 25 June 2025.
In recent years, Central Asia has emerged as a critical geostrategic crossroads, poised between the ambitions of global powers and the aspirations of its diverse societies. The 2022 UN resolution declaring the region a “Zone of Peace, Trust, and Cooperation” offers a bold diplomatic vision—but one that must contend with deep-rooted historical, political, and infrastructural challenges. In this wide-ranging interview, we speak with the author of the article “Is the New Silk Road Still on Track to Create a Zone of Peace, Trust, and Cooperation?”—a powerful analysis originally published on Narrativa360 and republished in our Insights section too. Drawing from a deep understanding of the region’s civilizational legacy, security dynamics, and diplomatic currents, the author reflects on the real-world prospects for integration, the role of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the complexities of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and the future of the Organisation of Turkic States. At the heart of the discussion lies a provocative yet timely question: can Central Asia transcend fragmentation and rediscover a pluralistic ethos rooted in its Turco-Persian past? This conversation offers critical insight into the competing forces shaping the region—and what it will take to turn a shared vision into lasting reality.
1. Your article explores the 2022 UN resolution declaring Central Asia a Zone of Peace, Trust, and Cooperation. Given the region’s history of rivalry and fragmentation, how realistic is it to expect this diplomatic vision to translate into long-term stability on the ground?
The vision of Central Asia as a Zone of Peace, Trust, and Cooperation must be assessed in light of the region’s entrenched complexities. Central Asia remains one of the least connected regions in the world, with countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan being double landlocked—severely constraining trade, mobility, and regional integration. This structural isolation is compounded by persistent challenges: the rise of radicalisation, particularly among marginalised communities in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; unresolved border disputes between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; instability spilling over from Afghanistan; and the centrifugal force of exclusionary nationalisms. These tensions are intensified by the region’s geopolitical positioning—caught between major powers with often competing strategic agendas. Collectively, these factors hinder economic progress and undermine the political cohesion essential for sustainable trust-building.
Yet the 2022 UN resolution is not merely aspirational—it is urgently needed. Encouragingly, Central Asian leaders are demonstrating a growing willingness to engage in collective diplomacy, recognising that regional solidarity offers a stronger path forward than fragmented nationalism. Recent progress on border demarcation illustrates a preference for political dialogue over coercive approaches. Within this context, the resolution provides not just symbolic affirmation but also a normative and strategic framework through which domestic and foreign policies can be reoriented toward cooperative security, pluralistic governance, and regional resilience.
While the road to sustainable development will be long and uneven, this shared vision offers a navigational compass for incremental but meaningful progress. Infrastructure and trade-based connectivity will play a pivotal role, but true integration hinges on a deeper alignment of identity and purpose—one that gives pluralism and cultural diversity the space to flourish. As I argued in my Narrativa360 article, the region’s historical inheritance—grounded in the shared civilizational legacy of Khurasan and the Turco-Persian world—offers the cultural adhesive needed to sustain and expand this envisioned Zone of Peace. This could pave the way for integration akin to that seen in regions like the EU or ASEAN. On this point, while Türkiye and Azerbaijan play visible roles in the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), it is the Central Asian members who form its core. To be genuinely inclusive and enduring, the OTS must also embrace Tajikistan and recalibrate its identity to reflect not just Turkic roots, but the full richness of the Turco-Persian civilizational synthesis—a hallmark of the region for at least a millennium. Without a shared heritage, the superstructure of the vision would lack a real foundation.
2. You identify China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as both a driver of development and a potential source of dependency. What practical reforms should Beijing consider to make the BRI more transparent, inclusive, and sustainable for Central Asian states?
As mentioned earlier, the 2022 UN resolution articulates a normative framework not only for Central Asian states to act in concert, but also for external powers to respect the region’s declared neutrality. This diplomatic stance empowers Central Asian republics to pursue a balanced, multi-vector foreign policy—engaging constructively with global actors including China, Russia, the EU, the US, Japan, South Korea, India, Pakistan, the Gulf states, Türkiye, and Iran.
This vision is increasingly reflected in regional diplomacy. Beyond the China–Central Asia Summit (the next of which is due in a few days), the C5+1 format—elevated from foreign ministerial to presidential level under the Biden Administration—as well as platforms such as the EU–Central Asia Summit and the GCC–Central Asia Dialogue, all signal growing international interest in multilateral engagement. These forums align with the vision of neutrality and cooperation and, if strategically expanded, could reinforce regional autonomy while attracting the investments necessary for political and economic development.
China’s BRI stands as both a driver of development and a potential vector of asymmetrical dependency. Central Asian states must therefore take deliberate steps to safeguard their strategic agency.
This involves identifying domains—such as infrastructure, security, or digital systems—where overreliance on a single external actor could limit autonomy. As I argued in my Narrativa360 article, alternative connectivity initiatives, including India’s and Russia’s regional corridors or Iran’s proposed rail links to the sea, can help diversify partnerships. Embedding infrastructure projects within cooperative regional frameworks—rather than through narrow bilateral deals—will be crucial to ensuring the BRI acts as a catalyst for, rather than a constraint on, Central Asia’s aspirations for peace, trust, and inclusive development.
3. The Iran–USA conflict has re-emerged as a serious threat to regional projects and energy markets. What contingency plans—if any—do Central Asian governments have to shield themselves from the fallout of this growing confrontation?
The current confrontation between Israel and Iran—exacerbated by U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and Tehran’s retaliation—has ushered in a new era of regional instability with direct and indirect repercussions for Central Asia. While the region has maintained a careful equilibrium—honouring historic ties with Iran while engaging pragmatically with Israel—such tensions now test the resilience of that balance.
Central Asia is geographically and logistically tied to Iran via energy corridors and overland trade routes. Turkmenistan’s gas swap arrangements with Iran enable exports to Turkey and Iraq, while Uzbekistan’s recent participation in the Chabahar Port Agreement (endorsed by Tehran) facilitates strategic access to the Indian Ocean. At the same time, Central Asia’s sustained but discreet relations with Israel—dating back to the early 1990s—have driven cooperation in security, agriculture, water management, and technology. However, these relationships have lost momentum amid China’s BRI, the Turkish-led OTS, and renewed European engagement.
In this context, an intensifying Iran–U.S. conflict or domestic instability within Iran could significantly affect energy exports, infrastructure projects, and the region’s broader geopolitical balance involving Russia, China, and emerging Middle Eastern players.
That said, Central Asian states have consistently pursued a cautious, well-calibrated multi-vector foreign policy grounded in strategic diversification and regional neutrality. This approach may provide a buffer. By engaging in alternative routes and initiatives—such as expanded cooperation with the Gulf states, closer ties with India through the International North–South Transport Corridor, and participation in the EU’s Global Gateway—they may be able to hedge against shocks arising from disruption in Iran. While formal contingency plans are not publicly acknowledged, this pragmatic diplomacy offers a platform for adaptive risk mitigation.
4. You propose reforming the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) to reflect a broader Turco-Persian identity. What would such reform look like in practice, and how can it avoid reinforcing cultural hierarchies in a region with deep ethnic diversity?
Pioneering world historian Marshall Hodgson coined the term “Persianate world” to describe a vast civilizational space stretching from the Balkans to Bengal—anchored along the Silk Road and at the heart of Eurasia. This shared cultural sphere enabled vibrant interaction among the region’s intelligentsia and gave rise to a cosmopolitan ethic that shaped politics, philosophy, literature, Sufism (tasawwuf), the arts, and science. It was during this flourishing—what I described in my Narrativa360 article as the Golden Age of Khurasan (c. 800–1200 AD), and what Frederick Starr termed the “Lost Enlightenment”—that the Turco-Persian synthesis emerged as a foundational mode of governance and imagination.
The essence of this civilizational model lay not in cultural homogenisation but in its embrace of plurality. It allowed diverse languages and traditions to flourish within a shared political and ethical framework—one that fostered unity without erasing difference. This is precisely the ethos needed to inform a more inclusive Organisation of Turkic States (OTS).
Currently, the OTS places significant emphasis on its Turkic linguistic and ethnic heritage. While this is vital, it represents only one facet of the region’s deeper legacy. To avoid reinforcing cultural hierarchies, the OTS must expand its identity to reflect the broader Turco-Persian synthesis that historically shaped the political, spiritual, and cultural life of Central Eurasia and the Silk Road. In practice, this would involve:
- Welcoming non-Turkic but historically connected states and communities—such as Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and even Pakistan—as equal partners.
- Curating shared cultural programmes and educational frameworks that highlight the legacy of Khurasan, the Persianate courtly traditions, and the inclusive scholarship that once defined the region.
- Avoiding ethnic exclusivism in institutional design, language policy, and representation mechanisms within OTS structures, and reforming ethnic nationalist ideologies to embrace multiculturalism.
- Framing unity through shared values—pluralism, tolerance, and intellectualism—rather than solely through ancestry, religion, or language.
Reimagining the OTS in this way would draw upon millennia of civilizational experience to create a platform that reflects not just ethnic but civilizational kinship, grounded in timeless values and tolerance. Only through such a vision can the region reclaim its legacy of unity in diversity and offer it as a model to the wider world.
5. You place Afghanistan at the heart of regional integration, yet Taliban governance remains a major hurdle. How do you envision realistic engagement with Afghanistan without legitimising an unrecognised regime?
The US-Taliban Doha Accord has not delivered stability in Afghanistan. Key obligations remain unmet or ignored. There has been no establishment of:
a) an inclusive administration—over 90 percent of cabinet and provincial officials are Pashtun Taliban affiliates.
b) protection for human rights, particularly women’s rights.
c) a credible counterterrorism or counternarcotic strategy.
Three key drivers of instability must be addressed to enable meaningful engagement with Afghanistan as part of a broader Regional Connectivity Plan:
Internal Political Fragmentation
The Taliban’s reliance on Pashtun nationalism and a Deobandi Islamic identity to consolidate power alienates much of the population. Many Afghans see the Taliban as a foreign-imposed force, created and sustained by regional powers like Pakistan for strategic ends. Their use of violence and repression reinforces perceptions of illegitimacy.
The Taliban’s Organic Ties to Terror Groups
Afghanistan became the epicentre of jihadist militancy in the 1990s. Many Taliban leaders—including Mullah Omar and the current Haqqani leadership—emerged from extremist groups in Pakistan with strong ties to Arab fighters. The Taliban continues to protect terror networks: for example, Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul in 2022 in a house linked to the Taliban’s Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani.
They also support regional terror groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the al-Qaeda-linked Jamaat Ansarullah (JA), which now controls districts in northern Afghanistan. The Taliban has displaced local Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik populations—under initiatives like the Qosh Tepa project—to settle terror group families in the north.
Radicalisation of Youth
The Taliban has announced plans to establish 3–10 madrassas in each of Afghanistan’s 420 districts, with thousands already operational. Secular schools are being converted to madrassas, often with Pakistani influence. This effort is radicalising youth, particularly in northern provinces bordering Central Asia, threatening the future of regional integration.
Overcoming Challenges Posed by Afghanistan to the Regional Connectivity Plan
Leveraging Shared Identities
Afghanistan’s complex demographic makeup—home to Tajiks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Sikhs, and Hindus—presents an opportunity. No single ethnic group holds a majority. Countries like Uzbekistan can use shared heritage to build cross-border cultural and economic ties, encouraging pluralism and countering extremism. Fostering regional identity could serve as a foundation for long-term integration.
Empowering Youth Freedoms to Counter Radicalisation
Almost 70 percent of Afghanistan’s population is under 30. Despite the shortcomings of the republican era (2001–2021), it offered youth exposure to civil liberties—freedom of expression, education, media, women’s rights, and limited democratic participation. Many young Afghans expect these freedoms and remain active on social media. The Taliban’s reversal of these gains is unrealistic in the long term. Greater regional economic integration—coupled with efforts to meet Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education and communications—could offer a medium-term path to empowerment and resilience.
Regional Initiatives to Condemn Gender Apartheid
The Taliban’s policies toward women constitute a form of “gender apartheid.” Despite beatings, detentions, and family threats, Afghan women continue to protest—often at great personal risk. Regional governments must amplify their voices at international forums and incorporate their demands into foreign policy discussions. The silence of neighbouring countries only emboldens the Taliban’s repressive tactics.
Supporting Civil and Armed Resistance Movements
Armed resistance continues in provinces like Panjshir, Baghlan, Badakhshan, and Takhar—led largely by the National Resistance Front (NRF), composed of former security forces, particularly special units. Taliban responses in these areas have included collective punishment and documented human rights abuses, as reported by UN Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett and organisations like Amnesty International.
Tajikistan has taken the lead in highlighting the resistance’s political demands. Other regional states, especially Uzbekistan, should consider following suit by advocating for a political settlement that ensures stability and inclusivity. Any credible regional connectivity strategy must address the legitimate grievances of Afghanistan’s people and support their right to self-determination.
As this conversation underscores, Central Asia stands at a pivotal juncture—caught between enduring fractures and emerging possibilities. While the 2022 UN resolution sets an aspirational course toward peace, trust, and cooperation, its success depends on more than diplomatic declarations. Real progress demands inclusive governance, deeper cultural recognition, and strategic autonomy in an increasingly multipolar world. From the promise and peril of the Belt and Road Initiative to the challenge of engaging Afghanistan without legitimising extremism, the region must navigate a complex landscape with clarity and conviction.
Yet there is room for cautious optimism. Central Asian states are demonstrating growing agency, pursuing multi-vector diplomacy and seeking regional alignment rooted not just in geography, but in a shared civilizational inheritance. Reviving the pluralistic ethos of the Turco-Persian world and reforming institutions like the Organisation of Turkic States to reflect that diversity may prove essential in building a stable, integrated, and resilient region.
Ultimately, the path forward will be shaped by whether the region’s leaders—and their international partners—can transform historical memory into a foundation for collective security, inclusive development, and enduring peace.